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The Whorfian time warp: 
Representing duration through the language hourglass 
 
 
Human existence revolves around time, yet we cannot touch or see time. How do humans 
experience the passage of time, and how do they construct their mental representations of it? A 
key finding is that concepts from the more tangible domain of space are often used to represent 
the passage of time (for overviews; Bender & Beller, 2014; Núñez & Cooperrider, 2013). This 
tendency is particularly visible in language, where spatial concepts are often recruited to express 
both duration (e.g., “a long meeting”) and succession (“Monday comes before Tuesday”) (e.g., 
Clark, 1973; Traugott, 1978). A possibility then is that duration is primarily represented through 
spatial schemas, possibly due to an innate tendency to associate time with space (e.g., Lourenco 
& Longo, 2010; Srinivasan & Carey, 2010) and/or overlapping cortical processing of these 
domains (Walsh, 2003). 
 However, another possibility is that language not only reflects our inclination to associate 
time with space, but it actually shapes our thinking about it. In this view, the spatial schemas 
reflected in conceptual metaphors (e.g., “long time”) provide the basis for our mental 
representation of duration (Lakoff & Johnson, 1980). This idea receives further support in the 
finding that our representations of abstract domains may be more susceptible to linguistic 
influence compared to concrete domains such as colour or objects (Borghi & Binkofski, 2014). 
Under this account, then, speakers of different languages would represent time differently 
(consistent with the linguistic relativity hypothesis, Whorf, 1956). For instance, speakers of 
English and Swedish, who primarily talk about time as “long” and “short”, would represent 
duration differently from speakers of Spanish and Greek, who talk about time as “big” and 
“small” (Casasanto, 2005b; Lakoff & Johnson, 1980; Núñez & Cooperrider, 2013).  
Here, we ask whether these different ways of talking about duration indeed lead speakers 
of different languages to represent the passing of time differently. We show that duration 
representation can change as a function of the presence of different linguistic cues in a simple 
duration estimation task. Surprisingly, switching the language context in the same bilingual 
individual also transforms the way they estimate duration. In three experiments, we implement a 
psychophysical task (Casasanto, 2005b) to investigate the effects of language on duration 
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estimation in monolingual and bilingual speakers of Spanish and Swedish. These languages 
exhibit robust differences in the preferred patterns of duration expressions, with Swedish 
speakers preferring distance-based metaphors (e.g., “long time”) and Spanish speakers preferring 
amount-based metaphors (e.g., “much time”) (Figure 1).  
In the task, participants either reproduced the duration of computer-generated animations 
showing either a container that filled gradually with liquid, or a line gradually growing on the 
screen. The fill level of the containers and the distance of the lines were irrelevant for duration 
reproduction. Instead, these displacements tested to what extent participants were able to 
disregard spatial information when estimating duration (Casasanto & Boroditsky, 2008). If 
language usage patterns correlate with humans’ representation of duration, it can be predicted 
that because Spanish speakers talk about duration in terms of amount, the fill level of the 
containers should interfere with their duration estimations to a larger extent than among Swedish 
speakers, who do not talk about duration in the same way. Conversely, because Swedish speakers 
talk about duration in terms of distance, the distance of the growing lines should interfere with 
duration estimation to a larger extent than is the case for Spanish speakers. We expect these 
cross-linguistic differences to be more apparent in the presence (Experiment 1) rather than in the 
absence (Experiment 2) of linguistic cues. If language meddles with temporal cognition, then we 
also expect Swedish-Spanish bilinguals to behave differently in this task depending on the 
language of the cues (Experiment 3). 
Additionally, findings from a different perceptual domain (colour) suggest that language 
is more likely to affect perceptual judgements of stimuli that are more difficult to discriminate 
(colours that are closer together in the spectrum) than of stimuli that are more easily 
discriminated (colours that are further apart in the spectrum) (Winawer et al., 2007). The current 
psychophysical task (Casasanto, 2005b) includes stimuli with varying degrees of duration and 
physical growth. We compared spatial interference for ‘extreme stimuli’ (those with the longest 
and shortest durations and physical growth in the stimulus set) and ‘medium stimuli’ (those with 
medium durations and physical growth) in all experiments. Because the perceptual properties of 
extreme stimuli in a given stimulus set are more easily discerned (Winawer et al., 2007), we 
hypothesized that medium stimuli would be more difficult to process, thus yielding a stronger 
language effect on temporal cognition. A pre-experimental study independently confirmed that 
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extreme stimuli elicited more precise duration reproductions than medium stimuli (Experiment 
1).  
Our findings show that duration estimation varied as a function of the presence of 
linguistic cues (Experiments 1 and 2), language context of operation (Experiment 3), and 
stimulus type (all experiments). We conclude that human temporal cognition is malleable, as part 
of a highly adaptive computational system, in which language flexibly functions as a source of 
information for duration estimation. 
 





Forty native Spanish speakers and 40 native Swedish speakers were randomly assigned to either 
the container condition or the line condition. Participants were University students in Madrid and 
Stockholm, respectively. In the absence of previous studies, we assumed a medium-sized effect 
(ηp
2
=.06) of the interaction between language group and stimulus type, alpha level of .05, along 
with default sample correlation and nonsphericity values (Faul et al., 2007), which yielded a 
recommended sample size of 36 participants (Experiments 1&2). We thus slightly over-sampled 
(40 participants), factoring in certain attrition (see below). 
 
Materials 
The Growing Lines and Filling Containers Experiments (Casasanto, 2005b) was used to assess 
duration reproduction.  
Line condition: computer-generated black lines grew from left to right against a white 
background. Nine different line distances, ranging from 100 to 500 pixels (with 50 pixels’ 
increments), and 9 different line durations, ranging from 1000 ms to 5000 ms (with 500 ms 
increments) were fully crossed to produce 81 unique line stimuli. 
Container condition: a 600 pixels high x 500 pixels wide black frame against a white 
background represented an empty container. Containers were filled in black from the bottom and 
up. Nine fill levels (ranging from 100 to 500 pixels with 50 pixels’ increments) were crossed with 
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9 durations (ranging from 1000 to 5000 ms with 500 ms increments) to produce 81 distinct 
container stimuli. 
All animations were presented in a 700 x 700 pixels’ field. 
 
Procedure 
Participants were tested individually by a native speaker of the relevant language, using a 15.6” 
laptop.  Each stimulus (line or container) was presented twice, resulting in a total of 162 trials. 
Half of the times, the participants estimated stimulus duration, and the other half they estimated 
displacement (distracter task). Spatial reproduction trials and temporal reproduction trials were 
randomly intermingled. Instructions for duration reproduction were void of spatial expressions 
(e.g., “estimate the time it took…” instead of “estimate how long it took…”). 
 A prompt preceded each stimulus, indicating whether duration or displacement was to be 
estimated. The prompt consisted of a symbol (an hourglass for duration and a cross for 
displacement estimation) and a verbal label. For duration reproduction, the labels were default 
expression of duration in Spanish (duración) and Swedish (tid). For displacement reproduction, 
the labels were either avstånd (‘distance’) or mängd (‘amount’) in Swedish, and distancia 
(‘distance’) or cantidad (‘amount’) in Spanish. Participants reproduced duration by clicking the 
computer mouse once, waiting the appropriate time, and clicking again. Displacement was 
reproduced by clicking the mouse once, moving it the appropriate distance/height, and clicking 
again. Presentation orders were fully randomised. 
Following previous studies on time estimation (Casasanto, 2005b; Casasanto & Boroditsky, 
2008), participants were removed if they estimated distance instead of time, or their overall 
duration estimations were markedly inaccurate (if the slope of the correlation between actual and 






The precision of duration reproductions for medium stimuli (2000-4000 ms and 200-400 pixels) 
and extreme stimuli (1000, 1500, 4500, 5000 ms and 100, 150, 450, 500 pixels) was measured by 
                                                 
1
 Extended, repetitive psychophysical tasks like the present one inevitably yield certain participant exclusion (e.g., 




calculating the discrepancy between actual duration and reproduced duration. As the current 
design rests on a robust effect of stimulus type, we assumed a large effect size (ηp
2
 = .14) and 
thus sampled twenty-four Spanish and 24 Swedish speakers (not part of the main experiments), 
who were randomly allocated to reproduce duration in either the lines or the container condition. 
Two participants were excluded due to poor performance (see above). 
For the line condition, a 2 (group: Spanish vs. Swedish) x 2 (stimulus type: medium vs. 
extreme) mixed Anova yielded a significant main effect of stimulus type, F (22, 1) = 12.639, p < 
.01, ηp
2
 = .367, showing that reproductions were significantly more precise for extreme than for 
medium stimuli. A similar result obtained for the container condition, F (22, 1) = 12.155, p < .01, 
ηp
2
 = .390 (see Table 1). No significant interactions or main effects of group were found. 
 
Design 
Following Boroditsky and Casasanto (2008), the degree to which stimulus displacement 
interfered with duration reproduction was computed by calculating the duration estimates for 
each fill level/distance, and then entering these two variables into a regression to obtain the slope. 
Higher slopes indicated proneness to estimate larger displacements as having longer duration, and 
were thus indices of greater spatial interference. Slopes were calculated separately for medium 
and extreme stimuli, and served as the dependent variable in the analyses. 
Participants’ overall accuracy for reproducing duration and displacement (distracter task) 
was controlled for (Supplemental Material). 
 
Results 
In the container condition, a 2 (language: Spanish vs. Swedish) x (stimulus type: extreme vs. 
medium) mixed Anova showed a significant interaction, F (1, 33) = 10.59, p = 0.003, ηp
2
 = 0.24. 
Spanish speakers showed more interference than Swedish speakers, but only for medium stimuli 
(p = 0.009). In the lines condition, a mixed Anova with the same variables revealed a significant 
interaction, F (1, 33) = 7.62, p = 0.009, ηp
2
 = 0.19. Swedish speakers showed more interference 
than Spanish speakers only for medium stimuli (p = 0.001) (Figure 2A). Such crosslinguistic 
differences conform to previous evidence showing similar patterns for English and Greek 
speakers reproducing duration in the presence of linguistic cues (Casasanto, 2005b), and are 





Experiment 2: Do crosslinguistic differences in time reproduction persist in the absence of 
verbal prompts? 
To test the persistence of the effects found in Experiment 1 in a strictly non-verbal context, we 
removed the verbal labels in the prompts appearing before each trial.  
 
Method 
Forty different native Swedish speakers (students in Stockholm) and 40 different native Spanish 
speakers (students in Madrid) were randomly assigned to either the container condition or the line 
condition. Three Spanish and 5 Swedish participants were removed due to poor performance. 
 Materials and procedures were identical to experiment 1, with the crucial exception that 
the label in the prompt was removed, leaving only the symbol (hourglass or cross). 
 
Results 
Contrary to what linguistic relativity would predict, we found no interaction between language 
and stimulus type, in either the line condition (F (1, 33) = 0.99, p = 0.328, ηp
2
 = .029) or the 
container condition (F (1, 33) = 0.03, p = 0.871, ηp
2
 = .001). Instead, interference patterns of 
Spanish and Swedish speakers were strikingly similar (Figure 2B). Moreover, both language 
groups seemed to display slightly greater spatial interference in the lines condition than in the 
containers condition. There were no significant main effects. 
 
 
Experiment 3: Does switching the prompt language trigger different interference patterns 
within the same individual? 
The results of Experiments 1 and 2 give rise to the possibility that human temporal cognition 
flexibly adapts to environmental constraints such as the presence or absence of verbal cues. 
Comparing the performance of bilingual speakers operating in different language contexts allows 
for this critical test. If temporal cognition is indeed adaptive as a function of language, then the 
same bilingual individual should exhibit different interference patterns depending on the 





Seventy-four adult Swedish–Spanish bilinguals performed either the container condition or line 
condition. The sample size was based on the parameters outlined in Experiment 1 and adapted for 
within-subjects analyses. Materials and procedures were identical to Experiment 1 with the 
exception that the distracter task was removed to minimise fatigue. Nine participants were 
removed due to poor performance. Participants took the experiment twice, once with Spanish and 
once with Swedish prompt labels (order counterbalanced).  
 
Results 
For the bilinguals in the containers condition, a 2 (language context: Spanish vs. Swedish) x 2 
(stimulus type: extreme vs. medium) repeated measures Anova showed a significant interaction, 
F (1, 34) = 9.38, p = 0.004, ηp
2
 = 0.22. Specifically, for medium stimuli, interference levels 
changed significantly in the direction predicted by the prompt language (p = 0.018) (Figure 2C).  
Likewise, for bilinguals in the lines condition, a 2 x 2 repeated measures Anova yielded a 
significant interaction between language context and stimulus type, F (1, 29) = 5.18, p = 0.028, 
ηp
2
 = 0.15. Again, interference for medium stimuli changed significantly as the prompt language 
changed (p = 0.04) (Figure 2C). No significant main effects of language were found for extreme 
stimuli in either condition. 
 
Discussion and Conclusions 
Using a simple psychophysical task in different language populations we have shown that 
language can influence humans’ representation of the passage of time. Linguistic cues yielded 
language-specific spatial interference in time estimation, while in the absence of such cues 
language-specific interference disappeared. Further, language-specific interference was confined 
to difficult discriminations. Our approach to manipulate different language prompts in the same 
population of bilinguals revealed context-induced adaptive behaviour: prompts in language A 
induced language A-congruent spatial interference. When the prompt switched to language B, 
interference became language B-congruent instead. To our knowledge, this study provides the 
first psychophysical demonstration of shifting duration representations within the same individual 
as a function of language context. 
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A central question then concerns the likely mechanism that underlies the reported effects. 
According to the label-feedback hypothesis (Lupyan, 2012), the perception of a given stimulus 
may be warped through co-activation of its corresponding verbal label. The degree of top-down 
modulation of language can then be regulated by manipulating the presence of the corresponding 
verbal label (Lupyan & Ward, 2013). In the current study, the label-feedback hypothesis would 
predict greater linguistic modulation in the presence of language prompts rather than in their 
absence, which was found in Experiments 1 and 2. However, the prompts used here do not 
contain the labels that would have to be involved in such modulation (i.e., spatio-temporal 
metaphors), and the fine temporal and spatial increments in the stimuli do not readily trigger 
labelling in the same way that colours or objects would (Casasanto & Bottini, 2014; Dolscheid, 
Shayan, Majid, & Casasanto, 2013). More importantly though, if the stimuli would readily lend 
themselves to labelling, the label-feedback hypothesis would predict greater language-specific 
spatial interference for the extreme stimuli, as these would be more likely to activate labels such 
as ‘long’ and ‘short’. However, it was precisely for the extreme stimuli that no language-specific 
effects could be detected. 
The current results may still be interpreted as an online warping of temporal judgments, but 
one that goes beyond a one-to-one mapping between label and percept. Under the predictive 
processing account (A. Clark, 2013; Hohwy, 2013; Kanai, Komura, Shipp, & Friston, 2015), a 
percept is co-constructed in a continuous interplay between downward flowing predictions and 
upward flowing sensory signals. The downward predictions are the system’s expectations given 
its knowledge about the world and the context, but are also continuously updated by perceptual 
input. Language constitutes one such source of prior knowledge, but also a potentially powerful 
bottom-up contextual cue (Lupyan & Clark, 2015). 
Under this account, the verbal prompts used in the current study constitute contextual cues 
(rather than ready stimulus labels), triggering spreading activation of semantically related 
linguistic knowledge (Çukur, Nishimoto, Huth, & Gallant, 2013), in this case language-specific 
duration metaphors, which in turn transitorily warp temporal processing. The powerful nature of 
this warping is most poignantly seen in the bilingual speakers: varying the language of the 
prompts changes what prior knowledge is recruited, thus yielding different language-specific 
modulations of duration estimation, within the same individual. Our findings also support the 
idea that the more ambiguous the input is, the less weight it has on perception, thus increasing the 
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system’s reliance on prior knowledge (Lupyan & Clark, 2015). This explains the reliance on 
linguistic knowledge in the harder-to-process medium stimuli, as opposed to the easier-to-process 
extreme stimuli, where no top-down linguistic modulation was found. 
Predictive processing is Bayesian optimality-driven, striving for a complete match between 
the bottom-up signal and the top-down expectations. The strong inclination humans have to 
associate time and distance (Srinivasan & Carey, 2010) could explain both language groups’ 
tendency to reproduce long line distances as longer in time in the absence of linguistic cues 
(Experiment 2). This raises a question regarding the precise impact of linguistic cues on a system 
that may already be optimised to predict correspondence between distance and duration. In 
Spanish speakers, the inclination seems to be overridden by the presence of linguistic cues 
triggering language-derived expectations, as indexed by the minimal spatial interference in the 
line condition (Experiment 1). In Swedish speakers, however, this inclination matches the 
linguistically derived knowledge, which could increase the expectation of distance-duration 
correspondence. Their difference in interference slopes between Experiment 1 and Experiment 2 
is however within the error margin, indicating a potential ceiling effect of the influence of top-
down information on duration estimation. 
By showing that language, under certain circumstances, can transform the basic 
psychophysical experience of the passing of time, the current findings align with important 
advances in linguistic relativity research highlighting that the effects of language on cognitive 
processing is not an either-or phenomenon, but are instead highly dynamic and context-bound 
(e.g., Athanasopoulos et al., 2015; Athanasopoulos & Bylund, 2013; Kersten et al., 2010; 
Montero-Melis, Jaeger, & Bylund, 2016). Specifically, the findings show that the strong 
inclination among humans to represent time through spatial schemas may be modulated by the 
specific ways these schemas are instantiated in different languages. The attested modulations 
conform to behavioural and neural evidence of the role of words as targeted manipulations that 
selectively enhance or mute the influence of any other aspect of prior knowledge, including 
which specific language the system may rely upon to inform top-down modulations 
(Athanasopoulos et al., 2015; Lupyan & Clark, 2015). Our approach to vary the language context 
within the same bilingual individual reveals that the observed patterns of behaviour are language-
induced (rather than the artifact of some between-subjects, extra-linguistic cultural factor 
(Casasanto, 2005a; Levinson & Majid, 2013). This resonates with the emerging view of a highly 
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adaptive human computational system, in which language can serve as a critical source of 
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